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Background: The debate on the ethical aspects of moral bioenhancement focuses on the desirability of using
biomedical as opposed to traditional means to achieve moral betterment. The aim of this paper is to systematically
review the ethical reasons presented in the literature for and against moral bioenhancement.
Discussion: A review was performed and resulted in the inclusion of 85 articles. We classified the arguments used in
those articles in the following six clusters: (1) why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement, (2) it will (not) be possible
to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should involve, (3) the feasibility of moral bioenhancement and
the status of current scientific research, (4) means and processes of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically, (5)
arguments related to the freedom, identity and autonomy of the individual, and (6) arguments related to social/group
effects and dynamics. We discuss each argument separately, and assess the debate as a whole. First, there is little
discussion on what distinguishes moral bioenhancement from treatment of pathological deficiencies in morality.
Furthermore, remarkably little attention has been paid so far to the safety, risks and side-effects of moral enhancement,
including the risk of identity changes. Finally, many authors overestimate the scientific as well as the practical feasibility
of the interventions they discuss, rendering the debate too speculative.
Summary: Based on our discussion of the arguments used in the debate on moral enhancement, and our assessment
of this debate, we advocate a shift in focus. Instead of speculating about non-realistic hypothetical scenarios such as the
genetic engineering of morality, or morally enhancing ‘the whole of humanity’, we call for a more focused debate on
realistic options of biomedical treatment of moral pathologies and the concrete moral questions these treatments raise.
Keywords: Moral enhancement, ethical analysis, neuroethicsBackground
Should we develop and implement interventions that aim
to improve people’s morality? Ever since the publication of
two papers in a special issue of the Journal of Applied
Philosophy in 2008 [1,2], the ethical desirability of moral
bioenhancement has been the subject of intense debate.
Whereas ‘traditional methods’ of moral betterment
(such as upbringing, socialization and education) are
arguably as old as humanity itself, the debate on moral
bioenhancement focuses specifically on the desirability of
the use of biomedical methods. Interventions that are
being investigated in the literature range from various* Correspondence: j.specker@erasmusmc.nl
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unless otherwise stated.types of psychopharmaceuticals, deep brain stimulation
(DBS), and genetic selection and engineering.
In a previous paper [3] we examine the different ways
in which the concept of moral bioenhancement is used
in the literature: what different authors understand its
main goals to be, what would count as a success, and
what kind of interventions would and would not fall
within their proposed definitions. In this paper, we ask
what reasons and arguments have so far been given in the
debate on the ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement.
We do this by mapping out the different arguments
that have been presented in the debate up till now
(see subsection ‘Arguments used in the debate’). We
aim to provide a complete overview including both
the main arguments in the debate as well as the less
commonly voiced arguments. In the final critical appraisal
section (see subsection ‘Critical appraisal of the current
debate’), we analyze the kinds of arguments given, therebyl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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discussed, as well as identifying those issues and concerns
that up to now have been neglected. This section represents
our own interpretation and views concerning the debate
and the arguments that are given. We argue for a shift in
focus of the debate towards a discussion of more realistic
interventions for specific target groups.
Discussion
Methodology
In order to give a comprehensive overview of the debate
so far, we conducted a literature search to collect all
publications that discuss ‘moral (bio)enhancement’ since
the start of the debate in 2008. With assistance from
a reference librarian, we selected suitable databases
in bioethics. In September 2013, we searched these
databases to find all publications that mention moral
(bio)enhancement. For the specific search terms and
strings per database, please consult Table 1. The results of
these searches were downloaded to Endnote, and duplicates
were removed.
Based on title and abstract, we excluded all articles
that are not directly related to moral bioenhancement.
As the main aim of this paper is to provide an overview of
the ethical reasons for and against moral bioenhancement
in the debate so far, we included only those publications in
which authors explicitly mention moral bioenhancement.
We excluded from our analysis publications on the moral
status of post-persons, unless there was an explicit
reference to the debate on the desirability of moral
bioenhancement. We also excluded those publications
that discuss moral bioenhancement but were not written
in English (N = 14). We discussed those publications that
we were less sure about (N = 99) until consensus was
reached. In April 2014 we repeated the exact same search,Table 1 Search terms and strings
Database Search string
Embase (morality/de AND ('genetic enha
OR (((moral* OR virtue* OR virtu
OR manipulat*))):ab,ti
Medline OvidSP ((morals/ OR Moral Developmen
Enhancement"/OR "neurosurger
ADJ6 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc*
Web-of-science TS = (((moral* OR virtue* OR virt
OR manipulat*)))
PsycINFO OvidSP ((morality/OR Moral Developme
OR (((moral* OR virtue* OR virtu
OR manipulat*))).ab,ti.
PubMed publisher (Moral enhanc*[tiab] OR Moral b
Scopus TITLE-ABS-KEY(((moral* OR biom
(ethic* OR bioethic*))
Google scholar "moral (enhancement|bioenhan
Scirus – preferred web/ProQuest "Moral enhancement" OR "Morain order to retrieve all publications that were published in
the intervening period (N = 22). All in all, 85 publications
were included. For a schematic overview of the selection
process, see Table 2 and Additional file 1.
We read the full-text of all articles and conducted a
thorough thematic document analysis, in which we
identified and coded each argument for or against
moral bioenhancement mentioned in each publication.
Based on this analysis, we formulated six broad clusters of
arguments: arguments on the need for moral bioenhance-
ment, on the possibility of attaining sufficient agreement
on what moral bioenhancement should involve, on the
status of current scientific research, on whether means and
processes matter with respect to the desirability of moral
bioenhancement, on the effects on the identity and the
autonomy of the individual, and finally on the social effects
of moral bioenhancement. This clustering was further
refined and complemented on the basis of the analysis of
all included publications, resulting in the final categories
and subcategories that can be found in this article
(see Table 3 for an overview of the arguments and
sub-arguments we identified).
We have conscientiously attempted to provide a neutral
and comprehensive review of the existing arguments, by
clearly separating the description of the arguments
(see subsection ‘Arguments used in the debate’) from
our critical appraisal of the arguments (see subsection
‘Critical appraisal of the current debate’).
Arguments used in the debate
Table 3 provides an overview of the clusters of argu-
ments and sub arguments we identified, as well as an
overview of the authors addressing the specific argu-
ment. The arguments are formulated in a neutral
way, and are almost always used by some to argue inncement'/de OR 'medical technology'/de OR 'neurosurgery'/de))
ous OR biomedical* OR bio-medical) NEAR/6 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc*
t/ OR Virtues/) AND ("Genetic Engineering"/OR exp "Biomedical
y"/)) OR (((moral* OR virtue* OR virtuous OR biomedical* OR bio-medical)
OR manipulat*))).ab,ti.
uous OR biomedical* OR bio-medical) NEAR/6 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc*
nt/OR Virtue/) AND ("Genetic Engineering"/OR "neurosurgery"/))
ous OR biomedical* OR bio-medical) ADJ6 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc*
ioenhanc*[tiab]) NOT medline[sb]
edical* OR bio-medical) W/3 (enhanc* OR bioenhanc*)) AND
cement|enhancing)"|"moral bio enhancement"
l bioenhancement"
Table 2 Selection of publications
Database Initial results Results after deduplication
Embase 1027 1008
Medline OvidSP 820 178
Web-of-science 1191 788
Scopus 449 261
PsycINFO OvidSP 427 253
PubMed publisher 17 10
Google scholar 192 142
ProQuest 75 58
Scirus 5 3
Total 4203 2701
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argue against it.
Below we will present the arguments we identified in
the literature, organized in the following six clusters: (1)
why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement, (2) it will
(not) be possible to reach consensus on what moral
bioenhancement should purport, (3) the feasibility of
moral bioenhancement and the status of current scien-
tific research, (4) means and processes of arriving at
moral improvement matter ethically, (5) arguments
related to the freedom, identity and autonomy of the
individual, and (6) arguments related to social/group
effects and dynamics.
In the next section, we will describe these arguments
in greater detail by summarizing these six clusters and
their components. Given the richness of the publications
we studied, it will not be possible to take account of all
the arguments in great detail. However, in the following
paragraphs we hope to sketch the outlines of the discussions
held so far and to provide an overview of the main
arguments identified under clusters one through six.
Relevant subthemes will be discussed under each cluster.
1. Why We (Don’t) Need Moral Bioenhancement
The arguments gathered under this first cluster address
the question as to why (or whether) we in fact need
moral bioenhancement. What kinds of problems we hope
it would eradicate, what its advantages are compared to
other methods, and how it relates to traditional methods
of moral betterment. It is clear that most proponents
of moral bioenhancement feel the need to offer some
story on why there is in fact an urgent need for it.
Opponents or sceptics may doubt whether we need
moral bioenhancement at all.
There is scope for improvement
Almost by definition, most if not all people would benefit
from an improvement in their moral character. Different
authors vary, however, with respect to the kind of changesthey would like to see implemented: changes in moral
behavior, will-power, or moral agency and insight.
Because the moral character of most people is suboptimal
(or even defective by nature), every person has good rea-
sons to morally better herself. The general argument holds
that we have a moral duty to enhance ourselves, and that if
we need moral bioenhancement to reach this goal, we
should consider it: “it is not that taking medicine is
intrinsically moral or immoral, it is that a human
subject can use medication as a means to assist them
towards a moral end: reducing future harm. Such a
person exhibits altruism” ([57]: 180). The only right
attitudes towards one’s own bad motives and impediments
are non-acceptance and a desire for self-change, Thomas
Douglas ([1]: 235) maintains.
Where Douglas [1] presents the recognition that there
is room for improvement as an argument for moral
bioenhancement, others are of the opinion that although
we can agree that the world we live in now is far from
optimal, it is not clear why this would be a reason in
favor of moral bioenhancement. For example, according
to Nicholas Agar: “We don't need superior moral vision
to understand that poverty, climate change, and terrorism
are bad things. (…) We do need enhanced effort and
perhaps enhanced nonmoral powers to fix poverty,
climate change, and terrorism but we don't need enhanced
moral vision to recognize that they need fixing” ([4]: 75).
Human biological nature is defective
In defense of the need for moral bioenhancement to
morally better ourselves, Ingmar Persson and Julian
Savulescu argue that there is a fundamental mismatch
between our moral psychology and today’s conditions of
human life ([28]: 124). Because human moral psychology
evolved in conditions that are radically different from
those in today’s world, we should alter human moral
psychology by biomedical and genetic means, they argue:
People encode the race of each individual they
encounter, and do so via computational processes that
appear to be both automatic and mandatory. (…) If
genetic and biomedical means of enhancement could
counter such natural tendencies, they could have a
crucial role to play in improving our moral character,
that could complement traditional social and
educational means of moral enhancement ([2]: 168).
Others add that besides being ill equipped for today’s
conditions of human life, human beings are innately evil
to a greater or lesser extent. Wickedness is an indispens-
able part of human nature. If we want to eradicate evil,
we have to alter these immoral innate (biologically deter-
mined) tendencies of human beings. Socialization, upbring-
ing and education will bring us only so far. According to
Table 3 Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature
Cluster Argument Description/background Key articles
1. Why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement
There is scope for
improvement
Almost by definition, each person can
be/act/behave better. We therefore
all have a moral duty/imperative/reasons
to enhance ourselves. We have good
reasons for wanting to better ourselves.
Also: a duty to do the right thing.
[1,2,4-14]
Human biological
nature is defective
Humans are innately evil. Evil cannot be
eradicated by socialization and education
alone. Or: humans are innately good.
[2,12,15-27]
Traditional means are
(not) effective enough
Such as education, upbringing,
socialization. These will only bring us so
far. Or: they do suffice, are attractive and
effective.
[2,15,17,19,21,26-36]
Our only hope in
averting major disaster
Avoidance of ultimate harm. Some of the
world’s most important problems can be
attributed to moral deficits of individuals.
Or: those problems have other causes
besides the moral deficits of individuals.
Moral enhancement should accompany,
or even precede/ prioritize over cognitive
enhancement and scientific progress.
[1,2,8,15,17,19,21,24-29,34,36-46]
Moral bioenhancement
might reduce criminality
Promise of solving immoral and criminal
acts. Or: warning that these are not
necessarily the same.
[8,15,23,47]
2. It will (not) be possible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should purport
No consensus on the
mechanisms that
comprise our moral
psychology
The way we should interpret
neurobiological findings.
[1,2,5,8,10,15,48-56]
Behavioral changes
alone are (not) enough
Emotions versus moral reasoning.
Dependent on view on what is
considered worthy of moral appraisal.
Behavioral control, or: certain attitudes
towards behavior are also necessary
(they have cognitive content).
[2,5-8,11,12,15,17,23,29,31,32,34,44,46,48-51,54,55,57-67]
Ethical systems and
theories differ and
often disagree
Subjectivity of/disagreement between
main (substantive) moral theories.
Individuals and cultures differ, there is
moral pluralism. Possibility of being
neutral between different conceptions
of the good.
[1,2,4,8,10,12,13,15,16,23,24,29,31,48,49,52-55,63,64,67-69]
(Im)possibility of
considerable consensus
The question whether we can find a
common ground, despite moral pluralism.
Also: discussions on relativism/nihilism,
objectivism.
[1,7,13-15,18,24,29,34,42,48,54,55,63,65,67,69-71]
Situation- and
role-dependency
Situation dependency of what counts as
an improvement (morally). Different roles,
assessments of situations. Weighing
relevant reasons to act. One virtue can
turn into a vice dependent on the
situation.
[1,5,7,9,12,16,17,23,38,49,51,63,64,66,72-74]
Human enhancement
versus treating mental
disorders
Enhancing humanity or treating
mental disorders. Moral element in
mental disorders.
[4,8,23,24,29,34,61,72,75,76]
3. The feasibility of moral bioenhancement and the status of current scientific research
Status of current
scientific research
Further research is needed or,
technological possibilities are
already there.
[2,11,15,18,19,23,27,42,48,59,61,67,70,72,77]
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Table 3 Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature (Continued)
Complexity of our moral
psychology/biology
Makes it doubtful that we will
gain sufficient understanding.
[1,2,6,8,10,11,15,16,18,19,22,28,33-35,37,42,48,49,53,59,61-64,72-74,76-79]
Is morality genetically/biologically
determined? For example: are virtues
and vices heritable? Is the core of our
moral dispositions malleable by
biomedical and genetic means? Danger
of reductionism: we should not overlook
the impact of the socio-cultural
environment.
Unintended or
undesirable side effects
Interventions have effects beyond
the intended effects (also: bluntness
of the instruments).
[5,7,8,11,12,16-19,22,23,29,30,34,35,42,46,50,51,60,62,63,69,75,77]
A ‘baby and bathwater’ problem.
Moral bioenhancement might even
lead to the opposite: not moral
progress but moral decline.
Scientific rigor,
standards
Research ethical questions about
standards of good/sound science.
Is scientific experimentation permissible,
given that ‘lack of moral virtue’ is not a
disease?
[30,36,48]
4. Means and process of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically
Other (non-biomedical)
methods are preferable
Such as moral training, socialization
or (self-) education. Taking a pill might
seem ‘all too easy’ or too disconnected
from ordinary human understanding. Are
biomedical means intrinsically bad? Also:
man is not supposed to play God.
[1,5-7,9-11,15-17,23,25,32,33,35,58,62,80]
There is no principled
difference between
traditional and
biomedical means
Results matter, the means less so. [7,15,18,29,32,54,64,68,74]
Perhaps the difference lies in the
irrevocability/irreversibility of
biomedical means.
5. Arguments related to the freedom, identity, and autonomy of the individual
Moral bioenhancement
might threaten the
freedom of the
individual
Moral bioenhancement might impair
our freedom and diminish our freedom
to act on bad motives. It might subvert
moral agency.
[1,5,7-9,15,17,20,21,28,29,42,44,49,51,55,58-60,64,65,67,68,75,81,82]
Moral bioenhancement
might endanger our
identity and autonomy
Questions about personal identity,
and ‘true’ versus ‘brute’ self.
[1,4,8,9,30,33,51,57,64,67,68,75,78,81-84]
Enhancer decides on outcome of
moral bioenhancement (paternalism).
Might compromise autonomous,
informed choice.
Despite concerns about
individual liberty and
autonomy, a trade-off
is justified
The advantages outweigh the
disadvantages.
[1,5,20,21,29,42,45,60,67,68,74]
6. Arguments related to social/ group effects and dynamics
Moral bioenhancement
benefits others
Unlike other types of enhancements
(cognitive, cosmetic, sports). Or:
who benefits? The individual or society
as a whole?
[1,7,30,50,63,85]
Moral bioenhancement
might foster abuse
Moral bioenhancement might induce
free-riding (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma).
The virtuous exposed to exploitation by
the vicious. It may lead to moral decline.
[1,5,8,9,14,15,22,31,33,42,48,56,61,63,64,66,76,79,86]
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Table 3 Arguments for and against moral bioenhancement, presented in the reviewed literature (Continued)
Moral bioenhancement
might undermine moral
diversity and moral
debate
It might diminish opportunities for ethical
thinking/debate. Reasonable pluralism.
Moral bioenhancement might
generate social inequalities, elitism.
[4,14,23,31,47,48,53,54,61,63,71,74,76,79,85,86]
Risks of utopian
derailing
Progressive, well-intended, yet… [5,9,11,16,18,30,31,33,63,64,87]
Utopian.
Interventions will be used recklessly or
overenthusiastically. Moral perfectionism.
Mandatory
implementation or
free/parental choice
State neutrality versus free choice.
Danger of tyranny/discrimination.
[2,9,13,15,20,21,30,38,39,44,45,48,53,54,56,63,66,68-71,74,76,81,87]
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nature, we need biomedical interventions in order to
effectively alter human nature for the better: “For
sure, it may be possible to minimize some contem-
porary evil through better socialization, but it will
never be possible to eliminate it so long as human
nature remains unaltered” ([15]: 29).
On the other hand, Robert Sprinkle argues that the
observation that evil may not be an eliminable feature of
the human condition should temper our hopes regarding
the possibility of effectively addressing all forms of evil,
not raise them: “I, for one, never held such a hope”
([16: 89). John Harris turns the ‘humans are evil by
(biological) nature’-argument around and argues that
there is an inborn human goodness: “We have certainly
evolved to have a vigorous sense of justice and right, that
is, with a virtuous sense of morality” ([17]: 104).
Traditional means are (not) effective enough
In addition to stating the need for moral bioenhancement
due to our defective moral nature, some authors argue
that traditional means are ill-equipped or less effective as
compared to biological and/or genetic means. As mentioned
by David DeGrazia, surely, we already have at our
disposal many different means of enhancing our moral
capacities: methods such as “explicit moral instruction,
mentoring, socialization, carefully designed public policies,
consciousness-raising groups, literature and other media
that encourage moral reflection, and individual efforts at
improvement” ([29]: 361). However, Persson and Savulescu
argue that these means are not nearly effective enough to
help us counter the great evils of our time: “Biomedical and
genetic means may be much more effective in terms of
both how thoroughly and quickly they could improve
everyone in need of improvement” ([2]: 168).
Others, for example John Harris and Jamie Bronstein,
feel that this line of argument wrongly minimizes the
moral progress that has been made through those tried
and tested traditional methods ([17]: 104, [30]: 86), and
argue that these methods still offer many possibilities for
moral improvement.Our only hope in averting major disaster
On top of the need for effective interventions to morally
better ourselves, urgency is another critical factor that is
addressed in the debate. If we succeed in (biomedically)
enhancing people’s cognitive abilities, some argue, it
is of paramount importance to also – or even first –
enhance their moral abilities due to the risks that
cognitively enhanced human beings may pose to
others. In today’s technologically advanced world,
Persson and Savulescu argue that a “morally corrupt
minority” ([2]: 163) is increasingly able to inflict major
disaster on the majority. Moral bioenhancement might be
our only hope of engaging with other major challenges as
well. According to DeGrazia:
The status quo is deeply problematic because there is
such an abundance of immoral behavior, with
devastating consequences, and serious risk of worse to
come. (…) In addition to these harms and injustices,
there is the threat of truly massive harm. (…) It is
increasingly possible for a small number of individuals
to acquire the technical capability of inflicting terrible
harm ([29]: 362).
Harris, however, argues that we should instead embrace
cognitive enhancements, as they are our best prospect of
self-defense against disaster ([17]: 110). Adam Carter and
Emma Gordon argue that because cognitive and moral
enhancements are principally interconnected, we should
consider potential enhancements “outwith any essential
reference to a moral/cognitive conceptual dichotomy”
([37]: 8).
David Wasserman questions whether all of these evils
can be attributed to individual moral defects, and warns
us not to underestimate the role of defective institutions
([38]: 375).
Moral bioenhancement might reduce criminality
Last but not least, some authors such as Walker [15]
suggest that moral bioenhancement could achieve a
significant reduction in ‘evil’, referring to criminal behavior
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example Thom Brooks, warn us that immorality and
illegal behavior do not necessarily coincide:
Morality and law are imperfectly linked at best. First,
not all immorality is illegal. Lying is widely regarded
as immoral, but not all lying is criminal. (…) Second,
not all illegality is immoral. Drug offenses are widely
incorporated in most legal systems, but it is unclear at
best whether cannabis use is intrinsically immoral.
([47]: 29)
Because the project of moral bioenhancement and
the project of reducing criminality are not necessarily
the same, it is argued that we should be careful in
suggesting that moral bioenhancement might indeed
reduce criminality and using this as an argument for
moral bioenhancement.
2. It Will (Not) Be Possible to Reach Consensus On What
Moral Bioenhancement Should Purport
In this second cluster we discuss arguments that address
the many different kinds of disagreement that influence the
different proposals on the way moral bioenhancement
should take shape. Opponents of moral bioenhancement
think that because of these allegedly fundamental disagree-
ments, moral bioenhancement is a problematic endeavor.
Proponents, however, argue that sufficient consensus is
possible, and that these differences need not necessarily
jeopardize the project of moral bioenhancement.
No consensus on the mechanisms that comprise our moral
psychology
The first issue that fuels disagreement on the way moral
bioenhancement should take place relates to our limited
knowledge concerning our moral psychology. Moreover,
according to Persson and Savulescu, how we should
interpret and understand findings of moral psychology is
not straightforward, and influenced by our preferred view
on what constitutes morality: “what morality is, or of what
it is to be moral” ([2]: 168). Agar warns us that:
The absence of a consensus upon the mechanisms of
morality could prevent any agreement that a proposed
moral enhancer could really be enhancing morality,
whatever else it may be doing. This skepticism is not
the fault of the behavioral and brains sciences, but our
own, for failing to agree about which cognitive
processes are genuinely relevant to what we want to
call morality and moral agency ([48]: 5).
Behavioral changes alone are (not) enough
Even if a consensus would exist on the mechanisms of
morality and how to achieve more moral behavior, severalauthors question whether it is enough for any moral
bioenhancement intervention to have effect on behavior,
but not necessarily on other aspects of morality, such as
moral reasoning, moral insight, or moral will. Do behavior
control interventions constitute moral enhancement or
does moral enhancement require an accompanying change
in moral agency?
According to Douglas [1,5,6], reducing an individual’s
tendencies towards violent aggression directly, without
using cognitive means such as persuasion or deliberation
(and assuming this would effectively lead to less immoral
behavior), would count as moral enhancement. Harris
[17,31,58-60], however, insists that without concurrent
changes in a person’s moral reasoning, these changes
would not amount to moral enhancement at all:
We will, I believe, always need to use moral reasoning
to act as a guide to our emotions and as a way of
checking that we are having appropriate feelings in
appropriate circumstances and for appropriate objects.
If the good involves feeling the right way, how do we
know that we are feeling the right way? ([58]: 172)
Fabrice Jotterand also argues that “the emphasis on the
control of moral emotions appears reductive and one-sided
in the sense that it conflates moral reasoning (as practical
reasoning) with moral psychology (how moral reasoning
acts on one’s motivational/emotional states)” ([49]: 5).
Bernard Baertschi argues that much of the disagreement
between Douglas and Harris can be attributed to their
different preferred meta-ethical positions ([50]: 66-67).
Harris adheres to a rationalist conception of ethics, accord-
ing to which emotions should only be acted upon through
cognitive means, and, as described by Baertschi, “reason
furnishes the only genuine moral motives” ([50]: 66).
Douglas however appears to be a sentimentalist, Baertschi
argues, i.e. espousing a view on ethics according to which
having the right feeling matters. Their different conceptions
of what morality is influence their different assessments of
whether moral bioenhancement might be effective. Whereas
Douglas thinks that direct modulation of emotions is effect-
ive (and permissible), Harris denies that direct modulation
of emotions even amounts to moral enhancement at all.
Ethical systems and theories differ and often disagree
The wide variety of substantive moral principles that char-
acterizes debates between ethical theorists, also hampers
agreement on what would constitute a moral enhancement.
John Shook provides the following example:
Suppose a brain modification transforms a person
into someone who now takes the moral deed to be
the one maximizing the welfare of all. (…) most
utilitarians would soon find fault with this new
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find fault with each other’s. And many deontologists
would simply deny that this fresh utilitarian has
received moral enhancement at all ([48]: 4).
Nevertheless, as DeGrazia argues, in one way or
another, every program for moral bioenhancement
needs to make explicit what it considers to be a
moral improvement, based on what kind of principles
or theory. Differences between various moral theories
are not necessarily purely theoretical, and may lead to
different normative judgments concerning a variety of
moral dilemmas (e.g. abortion, the death penalty, and
euthanasia) ([29]: 363).
Next to disagreement between the major ethical
theories, DeGrazia reminds us that individual (groups of)
people hold diverse and often conflicting moral outlooks.
They differ greatly with respect to the values they adhere
to: politically conservative or progressive values for
example ([29]: 363).
(Im)possibility of considerable consensus
In addition to the fact that a consensus is currently lacking,
some authors view ethical standards as “arbitrary products
of cultural history”, as Larry Arnhart wonders with regard
to Walker’s writings ([70]: 81). Or, given a pluralistic reality,
is it possible to be neutral with respect to wide-ranging
outlooks and ethical systems? Persson and Savulescu,
for instance, expect that their proposal for the core of
our moral disposition – consisting of altruism, a sense of
justice or fairness, and empathy – will be shared by many
([2]: 168-169). They think that despite the deep disagree-
ments between different accounts of right action, some sort
of actions (“the willingness to sacrifice one’s own interests
for the benefit of others”, for example) will be viewed as “a
moral enhancement, on any account of morality” ([68]: 5-6).
Walker also cautions against overemphasizing the
differences, and points to significant overlap between
different lists of virtues ([15]: 35). DeGrazia proposes
that we “stick to improvements that represent points of
overlapping consensus among competing, reasonable
moral perspectives” ([29: 364). Moreover, Filippo Sio and
colleagues claim that:
As in the cases of cognitive enhancement and social
progress, reference to some objective standards is also
necessary to make the concept of moral enhancement
coherent ([71]: 15).
Situation- and role-dependency
In addition to different views on morality and moral
behavior, situation- and role-dependency further add
to the confusion concerning what should count as a moral
enhancement. What should count as an improvement ishighly dependent on the specific context and the roles
performed in that situation (e.g. detached surgeons to
remove brain tumors, impartial judges to administer justice).
Wasserman asserts that even slight moral improvements
will vary according to the role and context in which
these are brought about [38].
Sprinkle approvingly cites Aristotle’s assertion that
“traits virtuous in moderation might be vices in absence
or excess” ([16]: 89). Moreover, Markus Christen and
Darcia Narvaez argue that “moral character cannot
emerge from a short-term intervention, but, as Aristotle
advised, must be shaped with mentoring through
multiple situations over time” ([32]: 26). Moreover,
Sarah Chan and John Harris refer to a situation in
which “serotonin-induced aversion to inflicting direct
harm” might have stopped passengers from forcefully
stopping a would-be hijacker ([51]: 131). In situations
like these, aggression can be a good thing, although it
is clearly bad in others. From this it follows that even
enhancing traits that everyone would agree to be 'good’,
may still not result in an overall, all-purpose, moral
enhancement. However, such criticisms on moral bio-
enhancement fail to consider, according to Kahane and
Savulescu, that this is “not at all an argument against
enhancement but, rather, an argument for more precisely
fine-tuned enhancement” ([12]: in press). For example, by
making biomedical interventions sensitive to certain
contexts, but not to others.
Human enhancement versus treating mental disorders
Some authors, such as Agar [72] and Jotterand [61], high-
light the difference between enhancing moral capacities of
individuals “beyond human norms” ([72]: 369) and treating
mental disorders that may or may not contain “an inherent
moral element” ([61]: 1). Dorothee Horstkötter and
colleagues for example argue that “if there is a health
problem, medical treatment is the reasonable reaction,
while enhancement, either moral or otherwise, does
not arise” ([75]: 27).
3. The Feasibility of Moral Bioenhancement and the
Status of Current Scientific Research
Under the third cluster, we discuss arguments based
on the alleged feasibility of proposals for moral bioen-
hancement. Whereas proponents of moral bioenhance-
ment are optimistic about the status of current scientific
research, opponents warn us that the complexity of our
moral psychology and biology make it doubtful that we
will be able to develop effective interventions.
Status of current scientific research
Current scientific developments give rise to both high
hopes and substantial skepticism. DeGrazia, for example,
rather optimistically lists research that may further the
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selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors as a means to being
less inclined to assault people, to deep brain stimulation
as a way to reduce aggression ([29]: 361-362). Walker sees
no technological reasons why the pre-implantation sorting
of embryos that is presently used to screen for genetic
diseases could not be used for selecting virtues ([15]: 31).
Molly Crockett warns us against overstating the con-
clusions of single studies, and asserts that science in
this field is “in its infancy” ([77]: 370). With respect
to genetic engineering Arnhart observes that clear examples
of “specific genetic linkages to virtue that could be altered”
are presently unknown ([70]: 79).
Persson and Savulescu admit that their proposals for
moral bioenhancement are mostly based on hypothet-
ical scenarios, and treatment at this moment is only
possible to a very small extent: “A lot more scientific
research is needed before we can be made more
altruistic or just by suitable drugs or surgery, or genetic
manipulation” ([2]: 172)
Although William Kabasenche thinks that human moral
psychology is highly complex and therefore that it is difficult
to ‘engineer’ virtues and vices, he feels that these studies
“give us important insights into what embodied virtues
might look like, and they suggest that we should take our
embodied nature seriously” ([62]: 20).
Complexity of our moral psychology/biology
Regardless of an optimistic or pessimistic view on the
status of current scientific research, it is also argued that
character traits, such as those involved in human morality,
are highly complex, and therefore that moral bioenhance-
ment is probably not feasible. These reservations are
not only expressed with respect to the manipulation of
neurotransmitters, but also with respect to the possibilities
of genetically engineering virtues.
Arnhart doubts that we are anywhere near having
found the “generic correlates of virtue that are clear,
strong, and manipulable” [70: 80]. Walker however thinks
that, given the fact that much progress has been made
in the behavioral genetics of schizophrenia, this field
can show the way forward to investigating the
possibilities of a comparable behavioral genetics of
virtue: “After all, genes for schizophrenia are polygen-
etic and show intensity of expression and gene-
environment interactions” ([18]: 91-92). Douglas also
feels that there are some elements of our moral psych-
ology that we are beginning to understand to such a
degree that manipulating them is possible: "it does not
seem unreasonable to suppose that moral enhancement
technologies which operate on relatively simple emotional
drives could be developed in the medium term" ([1]: 233).
Some authors, for example Robert Sparrow, voice
concerns about reductionism, i.e. “the claim that whetheran individual is a (morally) good person is a function of
that person’s neurochemistry and/or that person’s genet-
ics” ([63]: 27). Others, such as Hans-Joerg Ehni, Diana
Aurenque [33] and Chris Zarpentine [19], warn us not to
underestimate the importance of societal and cultural
influences.Unintended or undesirable side effects
Given the complexity of our moral psychology and biology,
can we hope to influence it without also altering other cru-
cial processes? Crockett [77] warns against the unintended,
and possibly undesirable, consequences of altering the
function of a specific neurotransmitter, beyond the
desired effects on moral behavior. Karim Jebari [7], for
example, discusses findings that suggest that enhancing
empathy may render individuals less fair and more partial
rather than less fair and more impartial. Agar provides the
following example:
What we recognize as the correct pattern of judgment
strikes a particular balance between the call of
empathy and the appeal of moral reasoning. (…)
Unbalanced enhancement of empathy is likely to
disrupt what we view as the morally correct trade-off
between benefits conferred on those to whom we are
socially bonded and costs experienced by those to
whom we are not socially bonded. It tends to
reinforce our tendency to endorse solutions that
inflict suffering on strangers to protect our nearest
and dearest from less significant suffering ([34]: 2).
In the case of genetic engineering, many more systems
than just the targeted virtue or vice might be effected.
For example, Bronstein asks: “What happens if selecting
for virtuous genes also increases the likelihood of cancer,
diabetes, heart disease, or even shyness or depression?”
([30]: 85).Scientific rigor, standards
In addition to the scientific and philosophical uncertainties
regarding our moral psychology and biology, some authors
touch upon the issue of future scientific experimentation
with respect to moral bioenhancement. Bronstein asks
whether medical experimentation is permissible, given the
fact that immorality is not a disease: "Walker's project
design may also violate one of the great principles of
human experimentation: that medical experimentation
approved by proxy on behalf of those who cannot consent
must benefit the patient. Lack of moral virtue is perhaps
suboptimal, but we have not yet classified it as a disease"
([30]: 85). Bronstein further observes that, in the case of
Walker’s Genetic Virtue Program, many questions can be
asked with respect to the research design:
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controlled environments so that they can be more
easily observed and exposed to uniform socialization?
If not, how can we know whether these particular
humans are indeed more virtuous, and that their
virtue is indeed genetic? ([30]: 86)
4. Means and Processes of Arriving at Moral Improvement
Matter Ethically
Under the fourth cluster, we discuss arguments that
explore the question as to whether the difference between
biomedical and non-biomedical means matters ethically.
Other (non-biomedical) means are preferable
From an intrinsic perspective, it is often considered whether
it would be better, more praiseworthy, or more authentic, if
a person betters herself without resorting to biomedical
means? Or as Douglas puts it: is it the case that adopting
“biomedical means to moral enhancement is objectionable
not just relative to other alternative means, but in an
absolute sense” ([1]: 236)? Sprinkle thinks that even if a
safe and “convincingly enduring” intervention would
become available, people would likely prefer a non-genetic
remedy ([16]: 89). This argument implies that we have
intrinsic reasons, such as authenticity and personal identity,
to reject biomedical interventions in favor of traditional
means for moral enhancement. It also assumes that there is
a principled difference between biomedical and traditional,
non-biomedical means.
Others argue that biomedical and non-biomedical
means will be used in concert, rather than separately.
According to Douglas [1], we will likely regard biomedical
enhancement and self-education as complementary and are
likely to reinforce the desire for both by initially engaging in
one or the other. Moreover, according to Kabasenche,
“none of us achieve any measure of success in moral
formation without significant assistance from others. If
authentic moral formation is something you do completely
by yourself, none of us has done it" ([62]: 20).
There is no principled difference between traditional and
biomedical means
Alternatively, some authors argue that there is no principled
difference between using traditional and biomedical means
to morally better oneself or others. DeGrazia, for example,
argues that (many of the) arguments against biomedical
means also apply to traditional, non-biomedical means:
“one should not inculcate moral values that are wrong, so
how can a parent be sure that she or he is justified in pro-
viding a particular type of moral instruction? Also facing
this challenge are public school teachers who attempt to
inculcate in students certain moral virtues such as civility,
respect for differences and concern for the poor” ([29]: 363).Likewise, according to Walker’s ‘companions in inno-
cence’ line of reasoning, any principled argument given
against biomedical means for moral enhancement, such
as those involved in his Genetic Virtue Program, equally
applies to socialization and education efforts: “If the
[Genetic Virtue Program] is wrong in attempting to pro-
mote virtue as a means of making people morally better,
then much current socialization and education is mistaken
as well” ([15]: 35-36).
Sparrow however maintains that a significant disanalogy
exists between traditional means of moral improvement
and the biological manipulation of behavior and motivation.
Whereas education is characterized by “a fundamental
moral equality between educator and educated”, biomedical
interventions to reshape the agency of others “involve a
subject acting towards an object and as such are fundamen-
tally structured by a profound inequality” ([64]: 26).
5. Arguments Related to the Freedom, Identity, and
Autonomy of the Individual
Under cluster five, we discuss various arguments regarding
the question as to whether moral bioenhancement would
limit the individual in his or her opportunities to freely
choose his or her behavior? We focus on concerns related
to individual liberty and autonomy.
Moral bioenhancement might threaten the freedom of the
individual
The concept of freedom takes a central role in the moral
enhancement debate, with Harris being one of its most
ardent defenders. He is of the opinion that individual
liberty is of utmost importance, and should take priority
over all other good ends that we might pursue. He explicitly
opposes “any measures that make the freedom to do
immoral things impossible, rather than simply making
the doing of them wrong and giving us moral, legal
and prudential reasons to refrain” ([17]: 105). William
Simkulet argues that “when one is forced against one’s will
to do as the virtuous person in one’s place would freely
do” we should speak of moral compulsion instead of
moral enhancement ([65]: 17).
Some authors, such as Jebari [7] and Birgit Beck [8],
call for conceptual clarification of a suitable concept of
freedom in the debate on moral enhancement: what kind
of freedom is at stake?
Moral bioenhancement might endanger our identity and
autonomy
Related to the worries concerning individual liberty,
concerns are voiced that moral bioenhancement could
pose a threat to our true, autonomous self. Douglas
argues that the counter-moral emotions that would be
altered are at best part of a person’s ‘brute’ self, and thus
enhancement would be “allowing his true self greater
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characteristics whereas our brute self refers to anything
that is external to this ([1]: 240). Certain enhancements
could alter our brute self in such a way that it constrains
our true self, thereby threatening our freedom and auton-
omy. At the same time, others argue that we should not
overestimate an individual’s capacity for full autonomous
behavior as exemplified by his/her ‘true self ’. For example,
Russell Blackford [78] warns against attributing to
ourselves a “spooky kind of autonomy all the way
down” that does not exist in the real world.
Some authors also worry about possible changes of
identity as a result of moral bioenhancement. Douglas
distinguishes a loss of identity in a strong sense, in
which an individual would, post-enhancement, be a
completely different person, and a weak sense, in that
moral bioenhancement would change some of her most
fundamental psychological characteristics ([1]: 239). Yet
Douglas stresses that we only have reason to preserve
those psychological characteristics that have positive
value for the individual in question. Whereas Douglas
emphasizes that the individual is free to choose, others
such as Agar [4] are less clear on how the positive value
of particular psychological characteristics is to be deter-
mined: on the basis of an individual’s own judgment, on
someone else’s judgment (e.g. within a criminal justice
contexts), or on a specific moral theory?
Given the large diversity of potential moral enhance-
ments, moral enhancement interventions will inevitably
prioritize some moral values or character traits over
others. This, some argue, will place the person who under-
goes the intervention at the mercy of the person perform-
ing the intervention: “Someone who has been subjected to
moral enhancement is likely to have a reduced sensitivity
to moral reasons rejected by his or her enhancer" ([4]: 75).
Despite concerns about individual liberty and autonomy, a
trade-off is justified
Acknowledging that moral bioenhancement might indeed
negatively impact the freedom, autonomy, or identity of
an individual, should this stop us from pursuing moral
bioenhancement? Some authors, for example Douglas [5]
and DeGrazia [29], stress that although such a loss might
be regrettable, if it is compensated by an increase of some
other good, the loss can be justified. DeGrazia, for
example, maintains that “we should not exaggerate the
value of freedom. After all, moral behavior itself, the end
product, is also extremely important—independently of
how free it is” ([29]: 367, see also Persson and Savulescu,
[20]: 252). Savulescu and Persson claim that:
We are not free to commit serious crime even now –
the laws prohibits it on pain of punishment. What we
weren’t free to do, the God Machine makes strictlyimpossible. If this is a loss, it would be outweighed by
the fact that there are no victims suffering from
serious crimes ([88]: 13).
Bronstein is not convinced however that this trade-off
is justified: "one might ask whether the goal of moral
perfection is worth the trade-off for human autonomy
on a large scale” ([30]: 86).
6. Arguments Related to Social/Group Effects and
Dynamics
Finally, under the sixth cluster, we discuss arguments
that consider possible societal and group effects of moral
bioenhancement. Would moral bioenhancement foster
abuse? Should its use be mandatory, and who should
decide? Is there overconfidence in the possibilities of
biomedical solutions?
Moral bioenhancement benefits others
To start, Douglas situates questions about the desirability
of moral bioenhancement in the context of the wider
enhancement debate, and argues that the fact that (unlike
other enhancements) moral enhancement primarily bene-
fits others, neutralizes many of the objections often raised
in the broader enhancement debate: “moral enhancement
[s] could not easily be criticized on the ground that their
use by some would disadvantage others” ([1]: 230).
Bronstein however turns this argument around, and
criticizes Walker’s Genetic Virtue Project precisely
because it appears to prioritize the benefits to others
over the benefits to the agent ([30]: 85). He worries that
in the design of the project, the interests of society will
take priority over the interests of the individual.
Walker [15] raises the worry that the biologically
unenhanced might be discriminated against in favor of
the biologically enhanced, but immediately adds that it is
not clear whether the same incentive for discrimination
would arise in cases of moral enhancement as can be ex-
pected in cases of physical and/or cognitive enhancement.
Moral bioenhancement might foster abuse
Another concern that is put forward, is the fear that an
altered ratio of moral people to immoral people might
give rise to free-riding: the few morally unenhanced
might more easily take advantage of the good intentions
of the many morally enhanced. This dynamic might be
visible not only between groups of individuals, but be-
tween countries as well, Shook suggests: “Depictions of
entire societies or a whole planet undergoing empathetic
moral enhancement will remain utopian fantasies. One
country after another will decline moral enhancement
until the “worse” countries have done it, and each country
would want their neighbors to go first” ([48]: 11).
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the resilience of the morally enhanced: “it seems to assume
that the virtuous are meek or compliant" ([15]: 42-43).Moral bioenhancement might undermine moral diversity
and moral debate
Moral enhancement also raises questions with respect to
which moral views or paradigms may benefit at the expense
of others, and whether this may lead to a diminished
diversity of views. Brooks argues that:
The question is not only whether moral enhancement
might lead to only one moral judgment, but also
whether moral enhancement might benefit some
reasonable moral, philosophical, and religious
doctrines over others. If not all reasonable doctrines
may benefit equally, then moral enhancement might
violate the equality between citizens and fail to
respect the reasonable pluralism that exists ([47]: 29).
This may hamper the quality of political and social
debate: Shook worries that moral enhancers “could
diminish opportunity, capacity, and responsibility for
serious ethical thinking” ([48]: 8) Moreover, in a fu-
ture dystopia, moral enhancements may be regarded as
suitable quick fixes in case of moral ambiguities and di-
lemmas, thereby further reducing valuable opportunities
for serious ethical reflection: “individuals thinking too hard
about moral ambiguities and dilemmas are told that they
simply need their enhancers adjusted" ([48]: 8).
Sparrow [63] worries that the morally enhanced would
gain important advantages, for example by their exclusive
participation in social and political institutions, thereby
generating or intensifying social inequalities.Risks of utopian derailing
Related to the risk of disrespect for reasonable pluralism,
some authors express the worry that the promises and high
hopes of moral bioenhancement projects (for example
Walker’s [15] proposal for a Genetic Virtue Project) will
repeat many of the mistakes (such as mass regimentation
and loss of autonomy) of what Bronstein calls ‘High
Modernist planning’: “Walker's plan features all of the
confidence, and many of the other signs, of High
Modernist planning. The project that he proposes is
transnational in scope; it seeks to transcend, or one might
even say ignore, current political realities. Its emphasis is
on the future, and it is enlivened by the discourse of the
good” ([30]: 86).
Sprinkle recalls the excesses of the eugenics movement:
“Walker's work should not be turned wrong-side-out. But
neither can the lessons of the Eugenics Movement be
taken as safely learned long ago. It was avowed to be aprogressive movement, a product of progressive thought
and an instrument for progressive action” ([16]: 89).
Mandatory implementation or free/parental choice
Despite the many reservations described above, if we
assume that safe and effective moral bioenhancement
would become available, would it be justifiable to make its
use mandatory – for all, or for specific target groups? First,
Bronstein raises doubts that many people will voluntarily
seek moral bioenhancement: “how large is the distance
between explaining what is good for you and imposing
what we know to be good for you? (…) Genetic virtue is an
idea that ought not to be imposed on an unwilling public—
and seems unlikely to find a willing public” ([30]: 86).
Persson and Savulescu however argue that an unwilling
public should not stop the program, and that safe, effective
enhancements should be compulsory: “If safe moral
enhancements are ever developed, there are strong reasons
to believe that their use should be obligatory, like education
or fluoride in the water, since those who should take them
are least likely to be inclined to use them” ([2]: 174). Rakić
[21,39] however argues that making moral bioenhancement
obligatory would deprive us of an essential part of our
human existence, that is, the freedom “for us acting
intentionally in a morally appropriate manner” ([21]: 248)],
and therefore advocates voluntary moral enhancement.
A specific version of this question arises with respect
to children. Should parents be the ones to decide
whether their children should undergo an intervention,
or whether their future offspring should be genetically
selected within the framework of Walker’s [15,18] Genetic
Virtue Project? Walker himself favors “some hybrid or
conditional option to mediate between the state-mandated
versus liberal (parental choice) implementation” in which
parents are free to choose which virtuous characteristics
they would like to see enhanced, but in which they are not
free to choose the associated vices ([15]: 43). Arnhart
wonders who will be responsible for setting and enforcing
the standards for these virtues and vices, and fears the
“threat of tyranny – either the tyranny of a few or the
tyranny of the majority” ([70]: 80-81).
Critical appraisal of the current debate
The debate on moral bioenhancement is a fairly recent
phenomenon. Douglas, in the first article on the subject
in 2008, discusses moral bioenhancement as a theoretical
possibility in the context of the discussion on the permissi-
bility of enhancement in general. Persson and Savulescu [2]
first discuss the possibility of moral bioenhancement in the
context of the rapid developments in the field of cognitive
enhancement. Although they are doubtful as to whether
moral bioenhancement is in fact feasible in the foreseeable
future, they nevertheless call for intensified research
efforts because they see moral bioenhancement as the
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Later on, the debate moved on to fundamental philosoph-
ical questions about what human morality involves, and
whether or not we would be able to reach enough
consensus to transcend our current pluralistic moral
reality. In what follows, we critically assess the arguments
discussed under the six clusters presented above, and
identify those issues and concerns that have been
neglected so far. We identified four topics of concern: (1)
the distinction between treatment and enhancement; (2)
an overestimation of the possibilities/feasibility of moral
bioenhancement; (3) insufficient attention to side-effects,
risks and safety; and (4) identity changes.
The distinction between treatment and enhancement
There has been surprisingly little discussion concerning
the criteria we should use to identify specific interventions
as moral enhancement rather than as therapy or moral
education. In the debate so far, it remains unclear whether
‘moral enhancement’ should be taken to include treating
those with a pathological lack of certain moral capacities.
Horskötter and colleagues argue that those interventions
aimed at restoring normal moral functioning in subjects
whose moral functioning is somehow pathologically
impaired, should be called medical treatment, rather than
enhancement ([75]: 27). Agar is one of the few authors in
the debate who do make this distinction. He claims that
targeted interventions aimed at “therapeutic ends” can
possibly amend specific deficiencies, but that these same
interventions “can produce unbalanced excesses when
used to enhance beyond human norms” ([72]: 369). Other
authors, for example Douglas [1] and DeGrazia [29],
appear to use examples of general moral enhancement
and specific mental pathologies, such as psychopathy and
antisocial traits (e.g. violent aggression), interchangeably.
Although some, for example DeGrazia [29], reject the
distinction between treatment and enhancement, and
while it is clear that the exact boundaries will of course
always be up for dispute, we believe that distinguishing
between treatment of those with pathologies and
enhancement of normal people will greatly benefit the
debate. Shifting the focus to treatment of pathological
deficiencies in morality raises new and interesting questions
that are different from the ones raised in the debate on
moral enhancement for normal people. What is to be con-
sidered normal moral functioning, and who is to determine
whether a subject functions ‘normally’? Should subjects
who lack certain capacities or who show ‘abnormal’ moral
functioning be considered to have a disease or disorder? In
other words: when should diminished moral functioning or
immoral behavior be considered to be pathological? How
should society deal with common moral deficiencies? As
mentioned above, Persson and Savulescu [2] argue that safe
and effective moral enhancement should be compulsorysince those individuals that need them will be least willing
and/or likely to use them. Such safe and effective moral
bio-enhancements are not available at present and difficult
questions remain to be answered. This brings us to our
final remark regarding the distinction between treatment
and enhancement: more debate is urgently needed on what
would be the right kind of response towards those who
behave immorally due to pathological deficiencies of their
moral capacities: treatment or punishment?
Overestimation of the possibilities/feasibility of moral
bioenhancement
Although some authors, such as Bronstein [30] and
Sprinkle [16], are very cautious and even skeptical, many
if not most authors in the current debate voice an
overwhelming enthusiasm concerning the feasibility and
future applications of moral bioenhancement. However,
based on the empirical possibilities available today and
in the near future, this enthusiasm seems somewhat
misguided. The lack of scientific scrutiny is particularly
striking when the possibility of genetic screening and
modification to morally enhance individuals and potentially
reduce criminal behavior is put forward (e.g. Walker’s
Genetic Virtue Project). Although genetic findings may
improve our understanding of the risk factors associated
with criminal behavior, we are far from identifying genetic
risk factors for crime that could predict with reasonable
certainty which individuals are at greater risk of engaging in
criminal behavior. There is no one-to-one relationship
between biological factors and criminal behavior. Indeed,
depending on the environmental context, many individuals
that carry biological risk factors for such behavior will not
develop it, while others who do not show these risk factors
might [89,90,91]. Genetic modification that could lead to
reliable moral enhancement is extremely far removed
from our present-day knowledge and capacities, and it is
doubtful whether it will ever be successfully achieved.
Morality and moral behavior are associated with so many
different areas of the brain, that it has been claimed that
morality is everywhere and maybe nowhere in the brain
[92]. Offenders with impaired moral decision-making, such
as individuals with antisocial personality disorder, show
overlapping abnormalities in several of these brain areas.
Morality and moral behavior are very complex human traits
and this is reflected at the developmental, experiential and
neuroanatomical level, and most likely at the genetic level
as well. It is misguided to think that we will be able to iden-
tify single genes or a single combination of genes that
underlie morality and moral behavior. As most psychiatric
and personality disorders are polygenic (i.e. involve a set of
genes) and genetically heterogeneous (i.e. different sets of
genes underlie the same diagnosis), it is highly likely that
complex cognitive-emotional processes such as morality
and (im)moral behavior are similarly associated with a
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among different individuals. Similarly, not all antisocial
individuals show the same biological deficits and a
wide range of biological and environmental factors may
contribute to antisocial behavior in a variety of ways [90].
Other potential interventions for moral enhancement
could be neurofeedback, transcranial brain stimulation
(e.g. magnetic stimulation, and direct current stimulation),
electrical stimulation of the brain via electrode implants
(e.g. deep brain stimulation or DBS), and neuron replace-
ment therapy (currently investigational). Although some of
these neurotechnologies have reached the stage of
demonstrated clinical effectiveness for certain disorders
(e.g. neurofeedback for ADHD, TMS for depression,
and DBS for Parkinson’s), few have reached that level
regarding phenotypic traits that likely contribute to
(im)moral behavior. Nevertheless, preliminary studies
indicate that transcranial brain stimulation might be
effective for addiction, isolated case-studies exist where
electrical brain stimulation via electrode implants is applied
for chronic aggression or addiction, and preliminary
experimental research suggests that functional magnetic
resonance imaging neurofeedback could hold some
potential for addressing addictions, antisocial personality
disorder, psychopathy and sexual disorders. Improving
‘normal’ moral traits or behavior with such means is even
further away from being practically feasible at present.
The idea of reliably bioengineering complex cognitive-
emotional processes such as altruism or virtues is not
feasible in the near future and it is highly unlikely
even in the distant future. Because so many different
biological and environmental factors influence an individ-
ual’s (im)moral behavior, we are convinced that biomedical
means alone will not suffice for moral enhancement.
Hence, the debate on moral enhancement should take as
its starting point a combined approach in which traditional
methods and emerging biomedical methods are used in
tandem.
Little attention to side-effects, risks and safety
Except for psychopharmacological or hormonal treat-
ments, few actual or potential interventions for moral
bio-enhancement have been discussed in the moral
enhancement debate. Moreover, whenever specific
biomedical interventions are discussed, it is particularly
worrisome that surprisingly little attention is given to
side-effects, risks and safety-issues. Every biomedical inter-
vention in the brain will likely have unintended, unwanted
or unexpected side effects, especially so in cases where the
underlying mechanisms of action are not well-understood
and/or the procedure is invasive.
While neurofeedback and transcranial stimulation are
non-invasive procedures, electrical stimulation of the
brain via electrode implants and neuron replacementtherapy are highly invasive. For example, aside from
risks associated with brain surgery and electrode place-
ment (e.g. brain hemorrhage, infection, death), DBS for
Parkinson’s disease carries a 1.1-33% risk of cognitive
side effects (e.g. speech disturbance), a 1.3-10.2% risk of
behavioral side effects (e.g. hypomania), a 0.5-25% risk
of psychiatric side effects (e.g. depression) and a 50-71%
risk of familial side effects (e.g. marital problems) [93].
While electrical stimulation of the brain via electrode
implants is essentially reversible, neuron replacement
therapy is a non-reversible procedure involving the
injection of stem cells into the brain or spinal cord.
Aside from the risks associated with surgery and stem
cell injections, this carries the risk of tumor growth,
seizures or intractable pain [94]. Finally, even more
familiar interventions such as pharmaceuticals and
hormones have risks and side-effects, and their long
term effects are not always known. In sum, in contrast
to what has been the case so far, safety should be a key
issue in the debate on moral enhancement.
Identity changes
It is particularly surprising from a philosophical point of
view that so little attention is given in the debate to
unintended, unwanted or unexpected identity changes
and the huge impact these changes may have on one’s
self-understanding, well-being and social and familial
relationships. This problem has been discussed quite ex-
tensively in relation to psychopharmaceuticals (especially
SSRI’s) and DBS, but potential identity changes due to
changes in one’s moral dispositions or behavior are not
often touched upon in the moral enhancement debate.
Within the broader biomedical treatment and enhance-
ment debate, several authors have convincingly argued
that whereas drastic identity changes are problematic
from an ethical perspective, typically requiring the discon-
tinuation of the treatment or intervention, mild or moder-
ate changes are not necessarily ethically problematic
(e.g. [95]). The key philosophical concept that is at
stake is the concept of narrative identity rather than
numerical identity. Narrative identity reflects an individual’s
most central and salient characteristics (e.g., motivations,
beliefs, values, desires, character traits) that together
comprise their self, and needs to be understood
within the dynamics of psychological change. These
characteristics may and often do change throughout
one’s life in response to various life events. It is important
for the continuity of narrative identity that such changes
are or can be incorporated into one’s life story in a
coherent way, without compromising one’s sense of self.
Since many if not most of such ‘naturally’ or ‘traditionally’
occurring changes are experienced in a non-problematic
and identity preserving way throughout our life, one can,
by comparison, argue for the ethical acceptability of
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ment or enhancement interventions [96,97]. At the same
time however, it could be the case that unforeseen,
instantaneous, uncontrollable and/or drastic changes in
one’s moral dispositions or behavior are more likely to
disrupt one’s narrative identity, giving rise to a whole new
array of personal and even societal queries. In agreement
with the latter view, in a public opinion study on biomed-
ical enhancement, individuals reported to be most reluc-
tant to undergo enhancements of traits that are more
fundamental to the self (e.g., morally relevant traits such
as empathy and kindness) and the most frequently voiced
reasons for resisting those enhancements were concerns
of changes to their fundamental self [98].
Summary
In this paper, we have categorized and discussed the
arguments in the published debate on the ethical
desirability of moral bioenhancement. We have organized
these arguments under the following headings: (1) why we
(don’t) need moral bioenhancement, (2) it will (not) be pos-
sible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement
should purport, (3) the feasibility of moral bioenhancement
and the status of current scientific research, (4) means and
processes of arriving at moral improvement matter
ethically, (5) arguments related to the freedom, identity
and autonomy of the individual, and (6) arguments related
to social/ group effects and dynamics.
After discussing each argument in more detail, we
have identified a number of issues that in our view merit
greater attention. First, we observed that, in the debate
so far, discussions about the moral enhancement of
‘humanity as a whole’ and the targeted treatment of
specific mental health disorders (such as psychopathy) are
not sufficiently distinguished. Many authors overestimate
the scientific as well as the practical feasibility of the inter-
ventions they discuss, rendering the debate too speculative.
Related to this is our observation that insufficient attention
is devoted to possible side-effects, risks and safety. There is
also remarkably little attention to questions about identity
and identity change.
We believe that the debate on moral enhancement is
extremely interesting from a meta-ethical point of view,
since it triggers important questions about the nature of
morality, moral thought and moral behavior. However,
the normative ethical question as to whether moral
bioenhancement as such is good or bad, desirable or
not, is not a very fruitful question for further debate. We
therefore believe that, instead of speculating about
non-realistic scenarios like the genetic engineering of
morality, or other imaginary forms of biomedical moral
enhancement of ‘the whole of humanity’, it would be much
more useful to discuss novel and emerging biomedical
interventions that may improve moral capacities or moralbehavior in specific target groups and in relation to particu-
lar mental health problems. For the near future, biomedical
treatment of moral pathologies may be a more realistic
option than moral enhancement, and may raise more
concrete moral questions.
In order for the moral enhancement debate to move
beyond its focus on speculative philosophical theorizing
and discussion, we need in-depth analyses of both the
practical feasibility of existing or novel biomedical
interventions for moral therapy (and perhaps eventually
enhancement); and the ethical acceptability of such inter-
ventions, including safety concerns.
We conclude that although the discussion on moral
enhancement so far raises interesting questions on an
abstract, philosophical level, it often appears to be too
remote from real (and realistic) contexts and applica-
tions to do justice to the specific ethical questions raised
by such practices. We therefore urge for a more focused
debate on realistic options of biomedical treatment of
moral pathologies and the concrete moral questions
these treatments raise.
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